Author Archives: Raúl Reina Cleaves

Variación tipo de cambio periodo 01 al 30 Noviembre 017

tasadecambioal30noviembre2017 Fuente: B.C.H.

Se adjunta detalle de la variación en el tipo de cambio del Lempira con relación al Dolar Estadounidense, periodo comprendido entre el 01 y  30 de Noviembre del 2017.

El valor del Lempira se ha depreciado en  4.61 centavos, al pasar de Lps 23. 5302  a  Lps 23. 5763 por  USA $ 1.

Reporte F.M.I. revisión quinta y sexta SBA con Honduras

ReporteNoviemmbre 2017 Fuente : F.M.I

Adjunto reporte, fechado Noviembre 2017,  del F.M.I.  sobre la revisión quinta y sexta del SBA con Honduras.

Algunos incisos de interés:

1-Inciso 21, pagina 23.

Allowing exchange rate flexibility would be appropriate as market conditions improve. The BCH remains committed to its crawling peg scheme which it believes has provided stability given significant dollarization of the economy. Staff suggested that with the stronger economy and the considerable reduction in fiscal dominance, there is room to allow the exchange rate to be more market-based. The recent reduction in surrender requirements is welcome and further reduction would be desirable once market conditions allow.

2- Inciso 3, pagina 37.

3- Inciso 2, pagina 39.

4- Carta de intención, inciso 2(ii) , pagina 54.

Propuesta para obtener la aprobación Corporación Desafío del Milenio FY 2019

Dado que el indicador de corrupción es el  gran obstáculo para que Honduras pueda obtener los beneficios del programa de la Corporación del  Desafío del Milenio, es necesario tomar acciones radicales sobre  el tema.

Por tal razón nos permitimos plantear la siguiente propuesta, dado que  próximamente se instalara en el país un nuevo gobierno :

PROPUESTA

” Que todos aquellos que manejan fondos del  presupuesto nacional, como ser   titulares de los poderes Ejecutivo, Legislativo y Judicial, Secretarios de Estado, Directores de Entes Centralizados y Descentralizados ,  Alcaldes de las cinco ciudades mas grandes del país , entre otros, otorguen autorización a la Oficina de Manejo del Presupuesto ( O.M.B. ) del Congreso de Los  Estados Unidos, para auditar el origen de  sus bienes y los de su familiares  mas  cercanos y luego publicar los resultados.

Vale mencionar que la O.M.B. es la entidad  que audita la  correcta utilización de los fondos de la Corporación Desafío del Milenio en los  distintos países beneficiados.

Consideramos que seria la forma mas rápida y efectiva  para demostrar a propios y extraños que, efectivamente, Honduras esta cambiando en lo referente al tema de corrupción y superaríamos por mucho la calificación requerida. Seguro que no existiría la  necesidad de realizar  evaluaciones ni encuestas si Honduras presentara una propuesta de este tipo.

El bienestar general del pueblo hondureño debe ser prioridad de todos.

Manos a la obra.

Deuda publica de Honduras a Septiembre 2017

DeudaexternaaSeptiembre2017 Fuente:B.C.H.

DeudaiinternaSeptiembre2017 Fuente: B.C.H.

Adjuntamos el monto de la deuda publica de Honduras,   que según reportes del Banco Central de Honduras  totaliza :

1- Deuda Externa Septiembre 2017: USA $ 6, 784. 7 millones.

2- Deuda Interna  Septiembre  2017: Lps  90, 017. 1 millones.

Comentarios

1- La deuda externa aumento USA $ 68.2 millones con relación al reporte de Agosto 2017.

2- La deuda interna aumento Lps  1,084. 9 millones con relación al reporte de Agosto 2017.

T.P.S. para hondureños en U.S.A.

https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/11/06/acting-secretary-elaine-duke-announcement-temporary-protected-status-nicaragua-and

Link  y Fuente: D.H.S. GOV.

Nota:Por la enorme  importancia que representan las remesas en la balanza de pagos de Honduras, QUE PERMITEN cerrar el déficit de cerca de USA $ 5,000 millones en nuestra balanza de bienes, servicios y renta, adjuntamos el link y copia del comunicado emitido por el D.H.S sobre el T.P.S. para los hondureños acogidos al mismo.
En Honduras, producto de la actual campaña política   y la traducción al estilo hondureño de este comunicado, no se ha dimensionado el problema económico que podríamos  experimentar en los próximos seis ( 6 ) meses.
Que Dios nos proteja  a todos e ilumine a nuestros gobernantes, para que podamos  salir con bien  de  esta  prueba.
 

Acting Secretary Elaine Duke Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for Nicaragua And Honduras

Release Date:
November 6, 2017

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
Contact: 202-282-8010

WASHINGTON— Today, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine Duke announced her decision to terminate the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation for Nicaragua with a delayed effective date of 12 months to allow for an orderly transition before the designation terminates on January 5, 2019. She also determined that additional information is necessary regarding the TPS designation for Honduras, and therefore has made no determination regarding Honduras at this time. As a result of the inability to make a determination, the TPS designation for Honduras will be automatically extended for six months from the current January 5, 2018 date of expiration to the new expiration date of July 5, 2018.

The decision to terminate TPS for Nicaragua was made after a review of the conditions upon which the country’s original 1999 designation were based and whether those substantial but temporary conditions prevented Nicaragua from adequately handling the return of their nationals, as required by statute. There was also no request made by the Nicaraguan government to extend the current TPS status. Based on all available information, including recommendations received as part of an inter-agency consultation process, Acting Secretary Duke determined that those substantial but temporary conditions caused in Nicaragua by Hurricane Mitch no longer exist, and thus, under the applicable statute, the current TPS designation must be terminated.

To allow for an orderly transition, the effective date of the termination of TPS for Nicaragua will be delayed 12 months.  This will provide time for individuals with TPS to seek an alternative lawful immigration status in the United States, if eligible, or, if necessary, arrange for their departure. It will also provide time for Nicaragua to prepare for the return and reintegration of their citizens. TPS for Nicaragua will terminate on January 5, 2019.

Regarding Honduras, Acting Secretary Duke concluded that despite receiving input from a broad spectrum of sources, additional time is necessary to obtain and assess supplemental information pertaining to country conditions in Honduras in order to make an appropriately deliberative TPS designation determination.  Based on the lack of definitive information regarding conditions on the ground compared to pre-Hurricane Mitch, the Acting Secretary has not made a determination at this time, thereby automatically extending the current TPS designation for Honduras for six months – through July 5, 2018.

However, given the information currently available to the Acting Secretary, it is possible that the TPS designation for Honduras will be terminated at the end of the six-month automatic extension with an appropriate delay.

Recognizing the difficulty facing citizens of Nicaragua – and potentially citizens of other countries – who have received TPS designation for close to two decades, Acting Secretary Duke calls on Congress to enact a permanent solution for this inherently temporary program.

Nicaraguans and Hondurans with TPS will be required to reapply for Employment Authorization Documents in order to legally work in the United States until the end of the respective termination or extension periods.  Further details about this renewal for TPS will appear in a Federal Register notice.

Signed Memos:

Nicaragua
Honduras

# # #

Topics:

Corporación Desafío del Milenio: evaluación Honduras FY 2018

reference-2017001200201-fy18-scorebook-web (1) Fuente: M.C. C.

Pagina 71

https://www.mcc.gov/who-we-fund/scorecard/fy-2018/hn

calificación de Honduras, link

Fuente: M.C.C.

Otra vez, como se ha vuelto costumbre, Honduras no logra calificar para ser beneficiaria del programa de la Corporación de Desafío del Milenio, el mas exitoso programa de ayuda que ha establecido el Pueblo y Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica desde los tiempos de La Alianza Para el Progreso. Se detalla evaluación de Honduras para el año fiscal 2018 en archivos anexos

Tema en que continuamos saliendo aplazados: CORRUPCIÓN

Solo queda preguntarse ¿ porque continuamos saliendo aplazados, si cada año  nos indican en que estamos fallando?

Algún día sabremos la respuesta.

ZEDES en Honduras

Nota: El siguiente es un articulo de The Economist.

Fuente:  The Economist,Edicion 12 Agosto 2017

Tropical mini-Utopias                    

Honduras experiments with charter cities

The Central American country has a bold plan to attract investment. It is not going well

ONE sunny Wednesday in Amapala, off the coast of Honduras, 33 working-age men settled themselves on rows of chairs on the main street under a tarpaulin to watch a football game. There was not much traffic to disrupt. The dilapidated town on the island of El Tigre had once been a bustling port, dispatching coffee and other commodities to Europe. Herbert Hoover and Albert Einstein thought the place worth visiting. But the German merchants and shipowners who had managed Amapala’s commerce left after the second world war; in 1979 the port moved to the mainland. The football fans now work intermittently as fishermen, farmers and drivers of three-wheeled mototaxis, most earning less than $2 a day. Some of the peeling pastel-coloured buildings bear signs in English, put up in expectation of a tourism revival that never happened.

Honduras’s government is promising a return to the glory days. In 2013 it announced plans to build a “megaport” in Amapala, along with a customs office and processing plants for exports such as shrimp, textiles and bananas. The money would come from private investors, who would be enticed by the establishment of three “employment and economic development zones” (ZEDEs). More ambitious than typical free-trade zones, these would be independent jurisdictions with their own laws, courts and police. The capital they attract would create jobs and relieve poverty. Rather than fleeing to the United States, Hondurans threatened by the country’s ubiquitous gangs could find security and livelihoods in ZEDEs.

The government has such faith in this idea that in 2013 it passed a law that adds ZEDEs to municipalities and departments as units of the republic. It is considering proposals for 20 ZEDEs across the country and has signed more than ten memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with investors, says Octavio Sánchez, one of the project’s leaders. Some are “ready to go—land bought, maps drawn and capital raised”, he says. The government may announce the first few projects at the end of August. They might be as small as a call centre or cover an entire city.

Sweet dreams are made of ZEDEs

It is easy to see why Honduras might want to create enclaves of safety and efficiency on its territory. It is one of the world’s most violent countries; laws and contracts are spottily enforced; its bureaucracy is a hindrance rather than a help to its citizens; infrastructure is rudimentary and in poor repair (see chart).

The government’s proposal for overcoming these defects draws inspiration from the idea of “charter cities”, new jurisdictions on empty land that bypass weak institutions to attract investment and jobs. Paul Romer, now the World Bank’s chief economist, popularised the idea after noticing that autonomous cities like Hong Kong and Dubai became magnets for investment. In 2010 Mr Sánchez, chief of staff for Porfirio Lobo, Honduras’s president at the time, asked Mr Romer to help set up the first “model cities” after seeing a TED talk that he gave.

Like Dubai’s free-trade zones, ZEDEs are to be “seamlessly integrated into the city”, says Mr Sánchez. But they also hark back to an older model from Honduras’s banana-republic days, when the country in effect turned over swathes of territory to giant firms like the United Fruit Company. “Banana enclaves are an example of the successful functioning of models from other states,” says Ebal Díaz, the secretary of Honduras’s council of ministers.

But the plan to correct the country’s faults one ZEDE at a time is causing alarm. The zones can be created in thinly populated areas without the consent of the locals. Hondurans inside them will lose some rights. Under the law creating ZEDEs, just six of the constitution’s 379 articles must apply within them, points out Fernando García, a lawyer in Tegucigalpa, the capital. These do not include those underwriting such rights as habeas corpus and press freedom.

The project is beset by conflict between foreigners brought in to help monitor it and Honduran officials responsible for putting it into practice, and by strife among the Hondurans themselves. What decisions have been made and who has made them are a mystery to people outside the process, and even to some who are supposedly part of it. Outsiders assume the worst. A recent report by the Carnegie Endowment, a think-tank, calls Honduras “emblematic” of countries in which “corruption is the operating system” of networks formed by government, business and “out-and-out criminals”. The ZEDE saga suggests that such a system will have great difficulty in creating one that is free of its own shortcomings.

The ZEDE plan has its origins in a coup and the complicated politics that ensued. The government of Mr Lobo, who won hastily arranged elections after the army ousted a predecessor in 2009, passed a law creating a forerunner to ZEDEs. After the constitutional court struck down the law, saying it violated Honduran sovereignty, congress dismissed the four justices who had voted against it and amended the constitution to allow passage of the current “model-cities” statute in 2013.

By then Mr Romer had broken with the project (after he realised that the “transparency commission” he was supposed to chair would never in fact exist). But it still has plenty of political support. The current president, Juan Orlando Hernández, who is running for re-election, sees ZEDEs as a vote-winner. He recently posted on Facebook a (perhaps fanciful) map showing how they would transform Honduras into the Americas’ “logistics centre”. A motley group of foreign libertarians, who like the idea of lightly regulated mini-Utopias for enterprise, are still involved. The Inter-American Development Bank has said it may lend $20m to back their development.

Even after seven years of work, the scheme is as vague as it is ambitious. No one outside a small group knows what the first project will be. Agile Solutions, a Brazilian software firm, talks of investing $200m to open a “startup village” in Tegucigalpa, creating 6,000 jobs. Its Honduran boss, Carlos Cruz, sees the zone as a “blank slate”, which the company could use as a laboratory for new approaches to health care, education and tax.

Another candidate to be the first ZEDE is a public-private partnership with Canadian investors to create an “energy district” in Olancho department, where wood would be harvested for fuel. The ZEDE itself would be confined at first to a 1.6 square km (0.6 square mile) patch, which will be occupied by a power station. But it could eventually expand to an area covering 8% of Honduras’s territory and including 380,000 people. HOI, a Christian NGO based in the United States, is to provide health care and education from the outset in this “area of influence”.

After spending millions of dollars on feasibility studies for Amapala, South Korea’s development agency concluded that the area is not ready for a megaport. So the Honduran government decided to start with a tourism project that scoops into several fishing villages on the bay, plus factories and a customs centre nearby. Some proposed ZEDEs are based on “Plan 2020”, a master plan for the country drawn up by McKinsey, a consultancy. It suggests creating 600,000 jobs by attracting vehicle-assembly operations, call centres and other industries from Asia.

Even now, just how ZEDEs will work is a matter of argument among their supporters. The law places effective control in the hands of investors and a “technical secretary” who will administer each zone (and must be a Honduran citizen). They are answerable to an independent “commission for best practices” (CAMP). Civil and criminal cases will be adjudicated by special ZEDE courts, though it is not clear whether each zone will have its own or whether they will join a single parallel system. They could employ foreign judges to hear civil and criminal cases, just as Honduran football teams hire foreign players, suggests Mr Díaz. A “tribunal of individual rights”, guided by international conventions, will protect residents. Its decisions can be appealed to international courts.

But this governance structure is not settled; participants do not agree on what has been decided or even on who is part of it. The original CAMP, appointed by Mr Lobo, had 21 members, including Grover Norquist, an American anti-tax campaigner, Richard Rahn, then of the libertarian Cato Institute in Washington, DC, and Mark Klugmann, a former speechwriter for Ronald Reagan. This body met just once, in March 2015, on the resort island of Roatán.

According to Mr Sánchez and Mr Díaz, it has been pared down to 12 members. Seven are Hondurans from the ruling National Party; the five foreigners include Mr Rahn and Barbara Kolm, an economist with links to Austria’s far-right Freedom Party, but not Mr Klugmann. This group has been meeting secretly in Miami. But power is now exercised by a five-person standing committee led by Ms Kolm, who is the only foreign member.

Mr Klugmann denounces the sidelining of the original CAMP as “illegitimate” and illegal. Arnaldo Castillo, Honduras’s minister of economic development, denies that it has occurred. The argument over which CAMP is in charge is also about principle. Mr Klugmann thinks good governance matters more to investors than cheap labour and light regulation. He wants ZEDEs to perfect their institutional set-up before they start operations. Mr Rahn seems to be losing heart. He was “asked to try to bring in best practices of corporate governance”, he says. But it has been an “uphill struggle”. Although the CAMP is supposed to be independent, Mr Rahn has “the strong impression that there is government interference”.

Mr Sánchez’s Honduran faction seems more eager to sign deals, and more willing to cut corners. One proposal is for a public-private partnership with Conatel, the state-owned telecoms company. Its boss is Mr Díaz, who is also the member of the CAMP authorised to sign MoUs and the head of the agency that registers land titles. Mr Sánchez sees no conflict of interest in this accumulation of roles. “It’s the same government,” he says.

The fuzziness about governance will increase suspicion that ZEDEs are a further way to enrich an entrenched elite and erode the rights of ordinary Hondurans. The National Lawyers Guild, a left-leaning American NGO, fears that the CAMP and the technical secretaries will wield unchallengeable power over ZEDEs and the people who live and work within their boundaries. Once established, ZEDEs can seize land to expand the zones. That may provoke conflict: 90% of Hondurans do not have titles to their homes and scores have died in land disputes in recent years. Hondurans living in areas marked out for ZEDEs have little idea what is in store. “We have never been in the loop,” says Julio Ramírez, Amapala’s bespectacled town clerk.

It is possible that nothing will change in sleepy Amapala. Salvador Nasralla, the leading candidate to unseat Mr Hernández in elections on November 26th, says he would repeal the ZEDE law (though that would require a two-thirds majority in congress). The CAMP chaos may drive away investors. But if they come, the football aficionados of Amapala may learn what it is like to be guinea pigs in a daring economic experiment. Their little island will be in Honduras, but no longer of it.

This article appeared in the The Americas section of the print edition under the headline “A shadowy experiment”

Variación tipo de cambio periodo entre el 09 y 31 Octubre 2017.

tipocambioal31octubre2017 (1) Fuente: B.C.H.

Se adjunta detalle de la variación en el tipo de cambio del Lempira con relación al Dolar Estadounidense, periodo comprendido entre el 09 y  31 de Octubre del 2017.

El valor del Lempira se ha depreciado en 12.87 centavos, al pasar de Lps 23. 3962  a  Lps 23. 5249 por  USA $ 1.

HONDURAS- F.M.I.: Exámenes quinto y sexto del SBA

Fuente: I.M.F.

El FMI completa los exámenes quinto y sexto en el marco de la SBA con Honduras

27 de octubre de 2017

· El Directorio del FMI completa la quinta y sexta evaluaciones del programa económico respaldado por un SBA de tres años.

· Las autoridades hondureñas han expresado su intención de continuar tratando los arreglos como precaución.

El 26 de octubre de 2016, la Junta Ejecutiva del Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) completó las quintas y sextas revisiones combinadas del desempeño de Honduras en el marco de un programa económico respaldado por un Acuerdo Stand-By (SBA). El 4 de diciembre de 2014, la Junta Ejecutiva aprobó un programa respaldado por un Mecanismo de Crédito Stand-By (SCF) de dos años y un Acuerdo Stand-By (SBA) por tres años (consulte el Comunicado de Prensa No. 14/545 ). El SCF expiró el 4 de diciembre de 2016.

La finalización de las revisiones permite a las autoridades acceder a los recursos por un monto total de aproximadamente USD 109,64 millones (DEG 77,70 millones). Las autoridades han expresado su intención de continuar tratando el acuerdo como precaución.

Tras el debate de la Junta Ejecutiva sobre las revisiones, el Sr. Zhang, presidente en funciones y subdirector gerente, dijo:

“El compromiso de las autoridades con su agenda de reformas se ha mantenido sólido durante el programa, que ha estabilizado con éxito la economía, restablecido la confianza y allanado el camino para acelerar el crecimiento y reducir la pobreza. El programa está en camino y las reformas avanzan como se esperaba.

“El panorama macroeconómico es positivo y requiere un esfuerzo continuo para mejorar los indicadores sociales. El déficit fiscal está en niveles históricamente bajos, las reservas internacionales están en máximos históricos y la inflación sigue siendo moderada. El desempleo sigue siendo un desafío para reducir y la pobreza afecta a más de la mitad de la población.Enfrentar estos problemas requerirá esfuerzos significativos para mejorar la cobertura de los programas sociales y asegurar ingresos fiscales adecuados, incluso mediante la racionalización de las exenciones tributarias y el fortalecimiento de la aplicación de impuestos.

“Las autoridades reconocieron la importancia de modernizar el marco de política monetaria para la estabilidad macroeconómica, y han comenzado el proceso para adoptar metas de inflación. Como parte de esto, han introducido un mercado de repos interbancario y han reducido los requisitos de rescate FX. Reconocen la necesidad de continuar con este proceso mediante la modificación de la ley del banco central para dar un mandato claro para lograr una inflación baja y estable.

“Las reformas estructurales son fundamentales para promover la inversión privada y crear empleos. Continuar con las reformas en el sector eléctrico, mejorar la eficiencia del gasto público, reducir la corrupción, cerrar la brecha de infraestructura y trabajar juntos en alianza con el sector privado son críticos para una expansión económica sostenida con marcada reducción de la pobreza “.

Mesa. Honduras: indicadores económicos seleccionados
Prel. Proj.
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
(Cambio porcentual anual a menos que se indique lo contrario)
Ingresos y precios nacionales
PIB a precios constantes 4.1 2.8 3.1 3.6 3.6 4.0 3.6
Deflactor del PIB 3.6 1.4 6.8 6.4 3.7 5.9 3.8
Precios al consumidor (eop) 5.4 4.9 5.8 2.4 3.3 4.5 4.0
Tipo de cambio (eop, depreciación -)
Lempiras por dólar de los Estados Unidos 1 / 20.0 20.7 21.6 22.4 23.5 23.5
Tasa real efectiva 2 / -1.7 0.3 3.8 1.8 -2.2 -1.5
Dinero y crédito
Crédito del sector privado 16.9 11.2 10.7 10.4 10.8 11.4 11.5
Dinero amplio 6.6 8.4 13.2 8.4 13.1 9.6 8.5
Tasa de préstamos (eop, en porcentaje) 16.7 16.9 15.9 14.0 14.3 14.2
Tasa de depósito (eop, en porcentaje) 11.4 11.0 10.4 8.8 8.2 8.4
Sector público no financiero
Saldo primario (porcentaje del PIB) -4.5 -7.0 -3.4 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.1
Balance general (porcentaje del PIB) -4.4 -7.5 -3.9 -1.0 -0.5 -1.2 -1.2
Deuda bruta (porcentaje del PIB) 32.4 41.0 41.3 41.2 42.5 43.0 44.1
Ahorro e inversión
Formación bruta de capital fijo (porcentaje del PIB) 24.4 22.9 23.0 24.8 23.2 25.9 25.7
Ahorro nacional bruto (porcentaje del PIB) 15.8 13.4 16.0 19.3 19.4 21.8 21.4
Sector externo
Reservas internacionales brutas (millones de dólares) 2,778 3,255 3,698 3,992 4,172 4,559 4.823
Reservas internacionales brutas (en meses de importaciones) 3 / 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.8 4.5 4.7 4.8
Cambio en las reservas internacionales netas (aumento -) 367 -546 -264 -307 128 -311 -251
Saldo de la cuenta corriente (porcentaje del PIB) -8.6 -9.6 -7.0 -5.5 -3.8 -4.1 -4.3
Exportaciones fob 4.8 -6.6 4.0 0.9 -4.2 10.3 3.6
Importaciones fob 2.2 -3.7 1.2 0.1 -4.8 10.5 3.1
Fuentes: Banco Central de Honduras, Ministerio de Finanzas y estimaciones y proyecciones del personal técnico del FMI.
1/2017 datos al 24 de octubre de 2017.
2/2017 datos a partir de junio.
3 / Se refiere a las importaciones del año siguiente de servicios no maquiladores y no maquiladores.

 

Departamento de comunicaciones del FMI
RELACIONES CON LOS MEDIOS

OFICIAL DE PRENSA: RAPHAEL ANSPACH

Deuda publica de Honduras a Agosto 2017

DeudaexternaAgosto2017 Fuente:B.C.H.

DeudainternaAgosto2017Fuente:B.C.H.

Adjuntamos el monto de la deuda publica de Honduras,   que según reportes del Banco Central de Honduras  totaliza :

1- Deuda Externa Agosto 2017: USA $ 6, 716. 5 millones.

2- Deuda Interna  Agosto  2017: Lps  88, 932. 2 millones.

Comentarios

1- La deuda externa aumento USA $ 29.0 millones con relación al reporte de Julio 2017.

2- La deuda interna aumento Lps  96. 3 millones con relación al reporte de Julio 2017.