Economía de Honduras

Deuda publica de Honduras a Mayo 2016

DeudaexternaaMayo2016 Fuente: B.C.H.

DeudainternaaMayo2016 Fuente: B.C.H.

 

Adjuntamos el saldo de la deuda publica de Honduras al mes Mayo  2016,  según reportes del Banco Central de Honduras su monto asciende a:

1- Deuda Externa: USA $ 5,811. 2 millones.

2- Deuda interna: Lps 79, 764,8 millones.

Comentarios:

1- La deuda externa disminuyo USA $ 33 millones con relación al reporte de Abril 2016.

2- La deuda interna aumento Lps 1,671,4 millones con relación al reporte de Abril 2016.

P.I.B. y Balanza de Pagos al I trimestre del 2016

pib_I_trimestre_2016 Fuente: B.C.H.

Balanza_pagos_trimestral (20) Fuente: B.C.H.

Se adjunta los resultados del P.I.B. y  Balanza de Pagos al I trimestre del 2016, según reportes del Banco Central de Honduras.

Comentario: El déficit en la balanza de bienes, servicio y renta totalizo USA $ 994.2 millones.

Tarjetas de crédito : cifras.

En días recientes en  el Congreso Nacional se inicio una campaña tendiente a penalizar como usura el interés que se cobra a los usuarios de tarjetas de crédito.

El porcentaje de interés y  ciertos abusos cometidos contra el usuario son  la parte mas visible de algo mas complicado.

Esto es el monto destinado a financiar este tipo de operaciones y la falta de capacidad de pago de los usuarios.

Tres son los actores que han propiciado el desarrollo de esta situación:

1- Los emisores de tarjetas, quienes anteponen el lucro a la seguridad y no analizan la capacidad  de  pago de a quien otorgan este instrumento. Es usual que un mismo usuario tenga varias tarjetas de crédito de distintos emisores.

2- Los usuarios que irresponsablemente utilizan este instrumento, sin tener la preparación  para entender su uso correcto y sin contar con una adecuada capacidad de pago.

3- La falta de un mayor control por  parte de la autoridad correspondiente por el impacto que este tipo de operaciones tienen en el sistema financiero.

Según estimaciones de la  Comisión Nacional de Banca y Seguros ( C.N.B.S. ) el  monto  del crédito otorgado bajo esta modalidad  totaliza  un 10 %  de los créditos  al sector privado.

Igualmente estiman que solo el 20% de este crédito es pagado a su vencimiento. es decir, que se cancela en el termino establecido,  un promedio entre 28 y 35 días

Lo  extraño es que mientras se haga efectivo el pago mínimo establecido por el emisor, el crédito no es considerado moroso, independiente del numero de meses en que solo se abone el pago mínimo , lo que permite al usuario continuar  utilizando su tarjeta hasta alcanzar el limite otorgado. Un circulo vicioso completo.

Para tener una idea del monto en este tipo de operaciones, basta realizar una sencilla operación matemática :

1- Crédito al sector privado al 16/Junio/2016 según el B.C.H. : Lps  230,235.9 millones.

2- Monto credito otorgado  en tarjetas de crédito: 10 % ( Lps 230,235. 9 millones) =  Lps 23,023 millones .

3- Monto no pagado a su vencimiento : 80% ( Lps 23,023 millones ) = Lps 18, 418 millones.

De continuar esta tendencia, mas temprano que tarde provocara serios problemas en el sistema financiero.

¿ Cuando se empezara a trabajar en la solución de este problema ? El tiempo lo dirá.

Inversion extranjera directa : I trimestre 2016

nota_informativa_ied_i_trimestre_2016 Fuente: B.C.H.

Adjuntamos reporte del B.C.H.  sobre la inversión extranjera directa en Honduras, durante  el I trimestre del 2016.

COMENTARIOS

1- Se incremento un 1.38 % en relación al I trimestre del 2015.

2- Panamá es el país del cual se recibió mayor inversión.

3-La reinversion de utilidades de empresas ya establecidas en Honduras continua siendo la mayor fuente de inversión extranjera directa.

Reelección presidencial en Honduras

El tema de la reelección presidencial ha demostrado a propios y extraños, la fragilidad institucional del Estado hondureño, asi como  la falta de consistencia,  de ética y moral, de ciertos  ciudadanos.

Sus actuaciones y comportamientos no dejan lugar a dudas. Ante el tema de la reelección presidencial sus posiciones :  2009 malo e ilegal, hoy bueno y legal.

El  daño causado a la economía del país por lo sucedido en el 2009 , cuando  el P.I.B.  decreció un dos punto cinco por ciento ( – 2.5 % )  y  la división social resultante,    no ha podido  sanar al día de hoy

Lo mas grave se presenta en la institucionalidad del Estado: El Congreso Nacional destituye a los magistrados que integraban la Sala Constitucional de  la Corte Suprema de Justicia, y quienes ocupan su lugar dictaminan que la prohibición de la reelección presidencial contenida en la Constitución, es inconstitucional.

 Ante estos hechos,  no queda mas que plantear lo siguiente:

1- ¿ que inversionista que se considere serio invertiría en el país, luego de analizar el comportamiento de   su    institucionalidad ?

2- ¿ porque no consultar al pueblo hondureño si desea la reelección presidencial, utilizando los mecanismos contemplados en nuestra legislación, como el plebiscito y así cerrar este capitulo obscuro de nuestra historia como nación, para poder avanzar con paso firme al futuro?

Ya es tiempo que la clase política  entienda que la finalidad de la institucionalidad del Estado es garantizar el bienestar de todos sus habitantes, no satisfacer caprichos personales o intereses de grupos.

Que  la historia se encargue de señalar a quienes solamente les  interesa su provecho personal, en perjuicio del bien común.

Deuda publica de Honduras a Abril 2016.

DeudaexternaaAbril2016 Fuente : B.C.H.

DeudainternaaAbril2016 Fuente: B.C.H.

Adjuntamos el saldo de la deuda publica de Honduras al mes Abril  2016,  según reportes del Banco Central de Honduras su monto asciende a:

1- Deuda Externa: USA $ 5,844. 2 millones.

2- Deuda interna: Lps 78, 093,4 millones.

Comentarios:

1- Tanto la deuda externa como interna continúan aumentando.

2- ¿ En que se emplea este dinero?

F.M.I- Honduras: comunicado de prensa Articulo IV y tercera revision

 

IMF Staff Completes 2016 Article IV and Third Review Mission to Honduras

Press Release No. 16/280
June 13, 2016

End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.

An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission, led by Roberto Garcia-Saltos, visited Tegucigalpa during May 31-June 13 to conduct the 2016 Article IV consultation and the third review of Honduras’ Fund-supported program.

At the conclusion of the visit, Mr. Garcia-Saltos issued the following statement in Tegucigalpa today:

“Honduras’ economic program with the IMF remains on track, with strong ownership and implementation by the government. Since December 2014, the government’s economic reform policies are laying a path for inclusive growth, greater coverage of the social safety net, and a better foundation for fiscal sustainability— including additional resources to improve citizens’ security. These achievements will anchor the strategy to obtain higher growth and better social conditions and job creation over the medium-term.

“The mission and the authorities reached staff level understandings for the program for the remainder of 2016 and 2017. The agreement contains quantitative targets, including a minimum floor on social spending, and appropriate policies to boost growth-enhancing spending by the government. The government met most performance criteria for end-December 2015. Two structural benchmarks are proposed for rescheduling for end-2016. Further institutional reforms to control and reduce tax exemptions will help to improve the allocation of scarce tax resources and reduce income inequality. These understandings are subject to approval by the IMF’s Management and Executive Board, which is expected to consider the third program review later in the year.

“In 2015, economic performance was better than expected. Real output grew at 3.6 percent supported by a boost in investment and the recovery in private consumption—which responded positively to a reduction in gasoline prices and strong remittances inflows. An improved macroeconomic policy mix and lower international oil prices have helped to reduce headline inflation, and narrow the external current account deficit. Headline inflation decelerated to 2.4 percent from 5.8 percent in the previous year, well below the inflation target of 4.5 percent. Meanwhile, the external current account deficit narrowed to 6.3 percent of GDP in 2015, higher than the 6.0 percent of GDP foreseen in the program, but lower than the 7.4 percent of GDP achieved in 2014. Net international reserves increased by US$307 million, supported by private capital inflows in excess of program projections.

“The 2016 economic growth outlook is favorable, amid steady credit growth and an expected increase in net international reserves. Real output growth is projected to grow by 3.6 percent in 2016, supported by agriculture, construction (including scaled-up public sector infrastructure investment) and a more supportive monetary policy stance. After the significant fiscal adjustment in 2015, and in line with the recently approved fiscal responsibility law, the non-financial public sector (NFPS) deficit is expected to widen from 1 to 1.5 percent of GDP to accommodate planned investment in infrastructure. Inflation is projected to remain in line with the inflation objectives, despite the expected rise in energy prices.   Meanwhile, consistent with expanding real sector activity and greater private sector confidence, credit to the private sector will grow in line with a sustainable pace of financial deepening.

“The economic reform agenda is moving forward. Last April, Congress approved the Fiscal Responsibility Law which would help to protect the hard-won fiscal gains. This is a step forward to institutionalize the much needed fiscal discipline and thus help to enhance the credibility of public policies. The challenge now is to develop the supporting regulations, including better control of tax exemptions and continue enhancing the transparency of budgetary practices across the central government and all public enterprises. On monetary policy, the authorities are committed to modernize the monetary policy framework by adopting an inflation targeting framework in the near-future and continue with exchange rate flexibilization. This is expected to provide the necessary cushion to help manage external shocks. To bolster financial stability and continue to reduce dollarization, the authorities are implementing measures to reduce currency mismatches by un-hedged borrowers while monitoring financial risks, including on the buildup of household debt.

“The staff team met with President Hernandez, Minister Coordinator of the Presidency, Jorge Ramon Hernandez-Alcerro, Minister Secretary of the Council of Ministers Ebal Diaz, Head of the Economic Cabinet and Minister of Finance Wilfredo Cerrato, Central Bank Governor Manuel Bautista, President of the National Commission of Banking and Insurance Ethel Deras, Minister of Infrastructure and Public Services Roberto Ordoñez, Presidential Commissioner on Tax Administration Angela Madrid, Vice Minister of Public Credit and Investment Rocio Tábora, Executive Director of the Interamerican Development Bank Marlon Tabora and other senior government officials, members of congress, and private sector representatives.

“The mission would like to thank the authorities and private sector representatives for a cordial and productive dialogue, as well as for their excellent cooperation and hospitality.”

 

IMF COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT

Media Relations
E-mail: media@imf.org
Phone: 202-623-7100

 

COMENTARIO

Si se reducen las exhoneraciones e incentivos ¿ como desarrollaran el plan 2020 ?

Calificación de Moodys – Comentarios

Adjuntamos el texto completo del comunicado de prensa de la empresa calificadora Moodys, referente a la clasificación B2.

https://m.moodys.com/research/Moodys-upgrades-Honduras-ratings-to-B2-from-B3-positive-outlook–PR_349459 Fuente : Moodys.com

New York, May 24, 2016 — Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”) has today upgraded Honduras’ government bond ratings to B2 from B3. Concurrently, it has upgraded the foreign currency and local currency issuer and senior unsecured ratings to B2 from B3. The outlook on the ratings remains positive.

Moody’s decision to upgrade Honduras’ ratings to B2 reflects the following key drivers:

(1) Honduras’ fiscal profile has improved significantly, with central administration deficit decreasing to 3.1% of GDP in 2015 from 7.9% in 2013, and debt-to-GDP expected to plateau this year at around 46% of GDP.

(2) The authorities have implemented institutional enhancements that have brought increased discipline to the budget process, tighter controls on government expenditures, and improved tax administration.

The outlook on the ratings remains positive and reflects Moody’s view of a likely continuation of steady progress on the fiscal front in 2016-17 and continued compliance with the structural reform agenda set in the IMF program.

Honduras’ long-term foreign currency bond ceiling has been upgraded to Ba3 from B2. The foreign-currency deposit ceiling has been upgraded to B3 from Caa1, while the local-currency bond and deposit ceilings have been upgraded to Ba2 from B2. The short-term foreign-currency bond and deposit ceilings remain unchanged at NP.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR RATINGS UPGRADE TO B2

FIRST DRIVER — FISCAL CONSOLIDATION IMPLEMENTED FASTER THAN CONTEMPLATED

The government of Honduras has reduced the fiscal deficit at a faster pace than originally contemplated in the Stand-By-Arrangement (SBA) and Stand-By Credit Facility (SCF) with the IMF. In 2015, the deficit diminished to 3.1% of GDP, down from 7.9% in 2013. We expect the government debt-to-GDP ratio to plateau in 2016 at around 46% of GDP, after an increase of more than 10 percentage points during the 2012-15 period.

To increase revenues, the authorities implemented a tax reform approved in 2013 which raised the sales tax rate to 15% from 12%, implemented a security tax, and strengthened tax collections. Efforts to curtail expenditures focused on reducing the public sector wage bill and maintaining government transfers to municipalities and state-owned enterprises virtually constant in nominal terms. The government’s fiscal profile has also improved due to lower gross financing needs, reduced interest rates, and extended debt maturities.

SECOND DRIVER — INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS MAKE FISCAL POLICY MORE PREDICTABLE

The improved fiscal performance is the result of comprehensive institutional enhancements that cover several ministries. These changes have brought increased discipline to the budget process, reducing revisions and exerting tighter controls on government expenditures. Under the new rule, a budget committee reviews ministries’ requests, approving only those requests that are within the budget limits.

In addition, new functions within the Ministry of Finance were created to oversee progress toward medium-term fiscal targets and monitor contingent liabilities, while a complete overhaul to the tax administration department has reduced tax evasion and widened the taxpayer base. In this context, the authorities developed a public investment diagnostic tool created with parameters from the IMF to strengthen the process of appraisal, selection and approval of investment projects.

The government recently passed a fiscal responsibility law which we expect will lock-in prudent fiscal policies and will increase policy predictability over time. The law establishes: (i) a maximum Non-Financial Public Sector (NFPS) deficit of 1% of GDP; (ii) a limit to current expenditure, which should not increase above the 10-year average real GDP growth rate plus inflation estimate for the following year; and (iii) a limit to new floating debt (arrears), which should not be greater than 0.5% of GDP in nominal terms. The fiscal responsibility law allows a transition period for 2016 through 2018, before reaching the definitive deficit ceiling of 1% of GDP by 2019.

RATIONALE FOR POSITIVE OUTLOOK

The positive outlook reflects Moody’s view of a likely continuation of progress in 2016-17, expecting compliance with fiscal targets, steady improvement in government debt affordability (i.e., declining interest payment-to-revenue ratio), as well as signals that prudent fiscal policy will continue in the next administration.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Continuing strong growth with GDP increasing at annual rates of 3.5% or above, compliance with fiscal deficit targets set in the fiscal responsibility law, and declining government debt ratios could lead to a further upgrade of Honduras’ rating. Continuing the extension of debt maturities in the domestic market and a continued reduction in the interest rate burden could also add upward pressure to the ratings.

Conversely, the outlook could be revised to stable if policy behavior is not consistent with newly created institutional arrangements, thus preventing additional progress on the fiscal consolidation front and stalling the positive trends that have been observed in recent years.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 4,869 (2015 Actual) (also known as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 3.6% (2015 Actual) (also known as GDP Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 2.4% (2015 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -3.1% (2015 Actual) (also known as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -6.4% (2015 Actual) (also known as External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 36.8% (2015 Actual)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been recorded since 1983.

On 23 May 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the rating of the Honduras, Government of. The main points raised during the discussion were: The issuer’s institutional strength/framework, have materially increased. The issuer’s fiscal or financial strength, including its debt profile, has materially increased. The issuer has become less susceptible to event risks. An analysis of this issuer, relative to its peers, indicates that a repositioning of its rating would be appropriate.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond Ratings published in December 2015. Please see the Ratings Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.

REGULATORY DISCLOSURES

For ratings issued on a program, series or category/class of debt, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to each rating of a subsequently issued bond or note of the same series or category/class of debt or pursuant to a program for which the ratings are derived exclusively from existing ratings in accordance with Moody’s rating practices. For ratings issued on a support provider, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the credit rating action on the support provider and in relation to each particular credit rating action for securities that derive their credit ratings from the support provider’s credit rating. For provisional ratings, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the provisional rating assigned, and in relation to a definitive rating that may be assigned subsequent to the final issuance of the debt, in each case where the transaction structure and terms have not changed prior to the assignment of the definitive rating in a manner that would have affected the rating. For further information please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page for the respective issuer on www.moodys.com.

For any affected securities or rated entities receiving direct credit support from the primary entity(ies) of this credit rating action, and whose ratings may change as a result of this credit rating action, the associated regulatory disclosures will be those of the guarantor entity. Exceptions to this approach exist for the following disclosures, if applicable to jurisdiction: Ancillary Services, Disclosure to rated entity, Disclosure from rated entity.

Regulatory disclosures contained in this press release apply to the credit rating and, if applicable, the related rating outlook or rating review.

Please see www.moodys.com for any updates on changes to the lead rating analyst and to the Moody’s legal entity that has issued the rating.

Please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com for additional regulatory disclosures for each credit rating.

Ariane Ortiz-Bollin
Analyst
Sovereign Risk Group
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
U.S.A.
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653

Anne Van Praagh
MD – Sovereign Risk
Sovereign Risk Group
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653

Releasing Office:
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
U.S.A.
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653

COMENTARIOS

1- La clasificación B2 de los bonos emitidos o por emitir del Gobierno de Honduras, implica que existe una mejoría en la capacidad de pago de  tales bonos, es decir, una reducción del riesgo de quien los  adquiere. La lógica indica que , por consiguiente, deberán  devengar una menor tasa de interés.

2- El Presupuesto de la Administración Central  del 2016 ,  se incremento en Lps 800 millones entre Marzo y Abril. En Junio 2015, también se incremento en Lps 2,000 millones el Presupuesto aprobado del 2015.

3- El monto de la deuda publica ( tanto interna como externa) ha  continuado aumentando a  Marzo del 2016, según los reportes del Banco Central de Honduras.

4- Coalianza continua incrementando  el pasivo contingente de Honduras.

5- En la medición del déficit fiscal,  no se consideran como gasto los llamados  programas  sociales.

Deuda Publica de Honduras a Marzo 2016

 

DeudaexternaMarzo2016 Fuente: B.C.H.

DeudainternaMarzo2016 Fuente: B.C.H.

Adjuntamos el saldo de la deuda publica de Honduras al mes Marzo  2016,  según reportes del Banco Central de Honduras su monto asciende a:

1- Deuda Externa: USA $ 5,821. 0 millones.

2- Deuda interna: Lps 76,959,2 millones.

Comentario: Tanto la deuda externa como interna continúan aumentando.

iiiOtra vez COALIANZAiii – Concesión del aeropuerto en Palmerola

Contrato Palmerola Completo Fuente: La Gaceta

Los objetivos que busca un  Estado al concesionar un bien o la prestación de un servicio son:

1- Eficientar la utilización del bien  o la prestación del servicio, a efectos de reducir su costo de adquisición a  los usuarios

2- Disponer de recursos para ser utilizados en satisfacer necesidades básicas de la población, como  salud, educación, seguridad, etc.

3- El bien común.

Como en Honduras somos diferentes, estos objetivos  no son considerados importantes por el ente rector de otorgar los mismos.

Los concesionamientos otorgados por COALIANZA en el pasado reciente, podrían repercutir negativamente en las finanzas publicas, por lo que que una de las condiciones impuestas a Honduras para lograr el acuerdo condicionado con el F.M.I. fue que se  descontinuara la practica de garantizar los ingresos a los favorecidos con los contratos de concesión, mediante la figura de Ingreso Mínimo Anual Garantizado.

Actualmente en el país se discute en todos los medios de comunicación, un nuevo concesionamiento otorgado por COALIANZA: El aeropuerto en Palmerola.

Para conocimiento de los visitantes, adjuntamos El Decreto Ejecutivo PCM-016-2016               ( adjunto arriba ), mediante el cual se otorga  la concesión del aeropuerto de Palmerola, aprobado por el Presidente de La República y su Consejo de Ministros.

Entre otros elementos, llama la atención la utilización de la figura denominada Mantenimiento del Equilibrio Económico Financiero  (Restablecimiento), incisos 9.21),9.22),9.23),9.24, paginas 68 y 69.

Este contrato de concesión tiene una duración de treinta ( 30 ) años, como se indica en el inciso1.88 , pagina 29, por lo que su incidencia en las finanzas publicas de  Honduras sera notoria, de no alcanzar las cantidades de pasajeros internacionales que sirvieron de base para el desarrollo del modelo económico.

El tiempo se encargara de mostrar a propios y extraños, si esta actuación de COALIANZA fue de beneficio o no  para Honduras.