Calificación de Moodys – Comentarios

Adjuntamos el texto completo del comunicado de prensa de la empresa calificadora Moodys, referente a la clasificación B2.

https://m.moodys.com/research/Moodys-upgrades-Honduras-ratings-to-B2-from-B3-positive-outlook–PR_349459 Fuente : Moodys.com

New York, May 24, 2016 — Moody’s Investors Service («Moody’s») has today upgraded Honduras’ government bond ratings to B2 from B3. Concurrently, it has upgraded the foreign currency and local currency issuer and senior unsecured ratings to B2 from B3. The outlook on the ratings remains positive.

Moody’s decision to upgrade Honduras’ ratings to B2 reflects the following key drivers:

(1) Honduras’ fiscal profile has improved significantly, with central administration deficit decreasing to 3.1% of GDP in 2015 from 7.9% in 2013, and debt-to-GDP expected to plateau this year at around 46% of GDP.

(2) The authorities have implemented institutional enhancements that have brought increased discipline to the budget process, tighter controls on government expenditures, and improved tax administration.

The outlook on the ratings remains positive and reflects Moody’s view of a likely continuation of steady progress on the fiscal front in 2016-17 and continued compliance with the structural reform agenda set in the IMF program.

Honduras’ long-term foreign currency bond ceiling has been upgraded to Ba3 from B2. The foreign-currency deposit ceiling has been upgraded to B3 from Caa1, while the local-currency bond and deposit ceilings have been upgraded to Ba2 from B2. The short-term foreign-currency bond and deposit ceilings remain unchanged at NP.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR RATINGS UPGRADE TO B2

FIRST DRIVER — FISCAL CONSOLIDATION IMPLEMENTED FASTER THAN CONTEMPLATED

The government of Honduras has reduced the fiscal deficit at a faster pace than originally contemplated in the Stand-By-Arrangement (SBA) and Stand-By Credit Facility (SCF) with the IMF. In 2015, the deficit diminished to 3.1% of GDP, down from 7.9% in 2013. We expect the government debt-to-GDP ratio to plateau in 2016 at around 46% of GDP, after an increase of more than 10 percentage points during the 2012-15 period.

To increase revenues, the authorities implemented a tax reform approved in 2013 which raised the sales tax rate to 15% from 12%, implemented a security tax, and strengthened tax collections. Efforts to curtail expenditures focused on reducing the public sector wage bill and maintaining government transfers to municipalities and state-owned enterprises virtually constant in nominal terms. The government’s fiscal profile has also improved due to lower gross financing needs, reduced interest rates, and extended debt maturities.

SECOND DRIVER — INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS MAKE FISCAL POLICY MORE PREDICTABLE

The improved fiscal performance is the result of comprehensive institutional enhancements that cover several ministries. These changes have brought increased discipline to the budget process, reducing revisions and exerting tighter controls on government expenditures. Under the new rule, a budget committee reviews ministries’ requests, approving only those requests that are within the budget limits.

In addition, new functions within the Ministry of Finance were created to oversee progress toward medium-term fiscal targets and monitor contingent liabilities, while a complete overhaul to the tax administration department has reduced tax evasion and widened the taxpayer base. In this context, the authorities developed a public investment diagnostic tool created with parameters from the IMF to strengthen the process of appraisal, selection and approval of investment projects.

The government recently passed a fiscal responsibility law which we expect will lock-in prudent fiscal policies and will increase policy predictability over time. The law establishes: (i) a maximum Non-Financial Public Sector (NFPS) deficit of 1% of GDP; (ii) a limit to current expenditure, which should not increase above the 10-year average real GDP growth rate plus inflation estimate for the following year; and (iii) a limit to new floating debt (arrears), which should not be greater than 0.5% of GDP in nominal terms. The fiscal responsibility law allows a transition period for 2016 through 2018, before reaching the definitive deficit ceiling of 1% of GDP by 2019.

RATIONALE FOR POSITIVE OUTLOOK

The positive outlook reflects Moody’s view of a likely continuation of progress in 2016-17, expecting compliance with fiscal targets, steady improvement in government debt affordability (i.e., declining interest payment-to-revenue ratio), as well as signals that prudent fiscal policy will continue in the next administration.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Continuing strong growth with GDP increasing at annual rates of 3.5% or above, compliance with fiscal deficit targets set in the fiscal responsibility law, and declining government debt ratios could lead to a further upgrade of Honduras’ rating. Continuing the extension of debt maturities in the domestic market and a continued reduction in the interest rate burden could also add upward pressure to the ratings.

Conversely, the outlook could be revised to stable if policy behavior is not consistent with newly created institutional arrangements, thus preventing additional progress on the fiscal consolidation front and stalling the positive trends that have been observed in recent years.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 4,869 (2015 Actual) (also known as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 3.6% (2015 Actual) (also known as GDP Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 2.4% (2015 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -3.1% (2015 Actual) (also known as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -6.4% (2015 Actual) (also known as External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 36.8% (2015 Actual)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been recorded since 1983.

On 23 May 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the rating of the Honduras, Government of. The main points raised during the discussion were: The issuer’s institutional strength/framework, have materially increased. The issuer’s fiscal or financial strength, including its debt profile, has materially increased. The issuer has become less susceptible to event risks. An analysis of this issuer, relative to its peers, indicates that a repositioning of its rating would be appropriate.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond Ratings published in December 2015. Please see the Ratings Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.

REGULATORY DISCLOSURES

For ratings issued on a program, series or category/class of debt, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to each rating of a subsequently issued bond or note of the same series or category/class of debt or pursuant to a program for which the ratings are derived exclusively from existing ratings in accordance with Moody’s rating practices. For ratings issued on a support provider, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the credit rating action on the support provider and in relation to each particular credit rating action for securities that derive their credit ratings from the support provider’s credit rating. For provisional ratings, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the provisional rating assigned, and in relation to a definitive rating that may be assigned subsequent to the final issuance of the debt, in each case where the transaction structure and terms have not changed prior to the assignment of the definitive rating in a manner that would have affected the rating. For further information please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page for the respective issuer on www.moodys.com.

For any affected securities or rated entities receiving direct credit support from the primary entity(ies) of this credit rating action, and whose ratings may change as a result of this credit rating action, the associated regulatory disclosures will be those of the guarantor entity. Exceptions to this approach exist for the following disclosures, if applicable to jurisdiction: Ancillary Services, Disclosure to rated entity, Disclosure from rated entity.

Regulatory disclosures contained in this press release apply to the credit rating and, if applicable, the related rating outlook or rating review.

Please see www.moodys.com for any updates on changes to the lead rating analyst and to the Moody’s legal entity that has issued the rating.

Please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com for additional regulatory disclosures for each credit rating.

Ariane Ortiz-Bollin
Analyst
Sovereign Risk Group
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
U.S.A.
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653

Anne Van Praagh
MD – Sovereign Risk
Sovereign Risk Group
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653

Releasing Office:
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
U.S.A.
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653

COMENTARIOS

1- La clasificación B2 de los bonos emitidos o por emitir del Gobierno de Honduras, implica que existe una mejoría en la capacidad de pago de  tales bonos, es decir, una reducción del riesgo de quien los  adquiere. La lógica indica que , por consiguiente, deberán  devengar una menor tasa de interés.

2- El Presupuesto de la Administración Central  del 2016 ,  se incremento en Lps 800 millones entre Marzo y Abril. En Junio 2015, también se incremento en Lps 2,000 millones el Presupuesto aprobado del 2015.

3- El monto de la deuda publica ( tanto interna como externa) ha  continuado aumentando a  Marzo del 2016, según los reportes del Banco Central de Honduras.

4- Coalianza continua incrementando  el pasivo contingente de Honduras.

5- En la medición del déficit fiscal,  no se consideran como gasto los llamados  programas  sociales.